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PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT IN SURGERY 
In Brief 
 
Surgeons have continuously strived to improve their outcomes and stretch the ranges of interventions in 
the care of our patients.  As procedures became more complex, technology interfaces increased, and the 
number of people involved in a team dramatically expanded, the risk for error and inefficiencies 
concomitantly rose.  In 1999, public scrutiny of healthcare was brought to the forefront by the publication 
of To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System.  Multiple regulations failed to fix the problem, and 
in many cases added to cost, without increasing safety.  In the United States, per-capita health care 
expenditures surpass that of every other country in the world and is nearly twice that of other high-income 
countries. Attempts to address the rising costs of healthcare have largely focused on payment reform; 
cutting costs by reducing payments and penalizing suboptimal outcomes. These have failed as the metrics 
incented do not necessarily reflect a path to efficiency and high reliability. A more appropriate approach, 
is to improve how care is delivered. Since greater than 20% of health care expenditures can be attributed 
to inefficiencies in the healthcare system, eliminating errors, defects and waste not only improves the 
quality and safety of the care that is provided, but also saves money. Surgeons are stepping forward once 
again and learning techniques for Performance Improvement initially developed in other industries and 
High Reliability Organizations (HROs.)  They have recognized the importance of charting a process and 
examining each step.  They are finding new opportunities in how humans interact with each other and 
within a system.  They embrace the importance of culture in sustaining gains.  This monograph will 
review the current nature of performance improvement techniques as applied to interventional practices. 
We will begin with an examination of the history of quality improvement techniques, expand upon the 
importance of data management and the utility of the Excel spreadsheet, and then recognize the most 
important part of any process – the human beings involved and Human Factors research.   Several quality 
and performance improvement tools are then introduced:  LEAN/ Six Sigma, Root Cause Analysis, and 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis.  Finally, we will close with an examination of how one moves from 
recommendation to action, and the vital role of leadership to foster engagement. 
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Emergence of Process Control 
The basis for many of the performance improvement tools of today started 100 years ago with the work of 
Walter Shewhart at Western Electric’s Hawthorne plant in Illinois. Previously quality was controlled by 
having multiple inspectors look at a finished product for defects, then return it for repair or discard.  
Shewart recognized that measuring and understanding the steps in the process, would signal when 
variation was occurring. It was Shewhart’s development of the statistical process control (SPC) chart that 
provided a visual representation of variation. An SPC chart builds on a simple run chart by adding a 
measure of variation that differentiates between what we now refer to as common-cause variation 
(random variation) and special cause-variation (non-random variation). These concepts are coming into 
medicine, with the understanding that frequently used simple run charts, although easy to create, do not 
allow an identification of a true variation.  
 Process control took an additional step forward with the contributions of W. Edwards Deming and 
Joseph Juran. Deming popularized the PDSA (Plan Do Study Act) cycle and Juran worked in post war 
Japan, identifying concepts such as the Pareto Principle (80% of the problems come from 20% of causes.)   
The rapid expansion in capability and quality from Japan’s manufacturing complex subsequently ensued.  
During the gas crisis of the 1980’s US auto manufacturers recognized the need to compete with foreign 
imports and sought to learn techniques such as the Toyota Production Method, LEAN and Six Sigma.  It 
also forced US companies to recognize the vital importance of the front-line worker in identifying areas 
of risk as well as providing possible solutions. This has been challenging in Medicine.  The top down 
management style of many hospitals has made adoption of these concepts challenging.  Further, surgeons 
were trained in hierarchical environments and taught that any error was a personal failure requiring 
blame.  This inhibited honest discussion of the system /human interaction.  Fortunately, this is beginning 
to change. 
Measuring and Analyzing Data 
Deming, Shewart and Juran all recognized that if you don’t measure something, you can’t fix it.  They did 
not have the types of incredible computing power currently at our fingertips.  It is quite easy to upload 
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vast amounts of data, although with the inherent risk of “Garbage In Garbage Out.” The Excel spread 
sheet provides an easy way to upload, organize and subsequently analyze data.  There are embedded 
capabilities to identify outlier and fraudulent cells.  Certain basic concepts will ensure that Excel can 
function optimally as a data storage and display tool.   
Most data of clinical usefulness will be either a continuous measurement (with a decimal point perhaps) 
or a discrete count (frequency).  In either case, if the data were measured again, the result would likely not 
be exactly the same.  In other words, data are uncertain.  This variation can be due to the property being 
measured or to the measurement technique itself.  As the number of independent measurements increases, 
estimates of the amount of variability can be obtained by the standard deviation, and an estimate of the 
variability of the average result (central tendency) can be obtained using the standard error of the mean.  
Proper understanding of data sets includes an estimate of the “central tendency” (mean or median), the 
amount of variability (standard deviation) and the amount of bias.   
At most surgical meetings and medical publications, statistical analysis uses a p value of <0.05 as a 
significant finding.  What his really says is that there is still a 1 in 20 chance that the findings were 
random.  The hazards of cause and effect analysis are further amplified in retrospective studies. 
Prospective, randomized studies control for all of the variables in life except those being studied.  
Therefore, the resulting outcome MUST be due to the treatment.  Just because a retrospective study is 
comparing the same treatment and variables does NOT mean that the same conclusion of cause and effect 
can be made.  Truly, a retrospective study can never FULLY determine cause and effect, only some 
ASSOCIATION.  Why is this?  Because a retrospective study has the variables and data already 
determined and probably not for the reasons currently being studied.  Many of the variables in the dataset 
are actually the RESULT of something else. 
When embarking on statistical analysis of an outcome, Excel can perform multiple types of t-tests.  
However, it is uncommon in modern medical research or process improvement to have only two groups.  
While this is sometimes handled by doing multiple combinations of t-tests, this introduces a large 
potential for error as well as violating the statistical principle of independence.  The traditional method of 
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handling multiple groups is to use Analysis of Variance (ANOVA).  ANOVA is completely different 
from t-tests, as it is based on differences in the dispersion (variance) and not in the central tendency.  Data 
also can be transformed for more accurate analysis and the relationships viewed visually with scatterplots 
and regression analysis.  The deeper nuances and tips for choosing the correct test as described in more 
detail within that section. 
Human Factors Consideration in Surgery 
Historically, errors made in the surgical theatre have often been attributed to an individual practitioner’s 
ability and skill.  However, by focusing only on human error we fail to address the number of contributing 
factors that create the conditions for errors to occur.  This view also neglects lessons for attaining safe and 
efficient performance seen in other high-risk industries. These include: organizational culture, teamwork 
and communication, physical layout, interface design and cognitive abilities. In high-risk/ high-reliability 
industries, these areas are often the focus of intervention.  
A systems safety or human factors approach, unlike that of many human-centered perspectives, suggests 
that error is often the result of a combination of various work environment factors. Accidents and adverse 
events in complex environments occur when multiple factors break down the existing barriers and defense 
mechanisms within a given system.   Perhaps one of the most comprehensive, and well-established 
models is the Systems Engineering Initiative to Patient Safety (SEIPS) model. This focuses upon the 
interplay of tools/ technology, organization, tasks, and environment in supporting or degrading a human’s 
performance.  Examples include the ergonomic challenges of minimally invasive surgery including the 
lack of depth perception, organizational attitudes toward productivity and response to adverse effects, 
simultaneous task overload, and noisy or distracting environments.  All of these works together to create 
increase the risk of error.  By the same token, lessons can be taken from other industries like aviation, 
where there is a “sterile cockpit” during times of high load – only essential communication is allowed, 
and extraneous tasks deferred.  Checklists may reduce the chance of missing a critical event – yet they 
must be focused to key points, so as not to induce “checklist fatigue.” 
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OR layout and noise are strong influencers on surgical performance. As technology has become better 
designed for efficient monitoring and treatment of surgical patients, the number of instruments, 
equipment, and connecting wires has only increased. Despite advances in technology, the size and 
architectural layout of the OR typically remains unchanged. In a study investigating workflow disruptions 
in the cardiovascular OR, researchers found that issues in the operating room layout and design 
contributed to about 20% of the disturbances. Of these issues, inadequate use of space, wrongful 
positioning of furniture and poor placement of equipment were most commonly observed.  Researchers 
suggest that decluttering, standardizing room layout, making use of under-utilized spaces for organization 
of equipment/supplies, and eliminating wiring through the use of wireless technology can help to mitigate 
clutter in the room. 
HROs also create an organizational culture that has five common themes:  1) commitment to resilience – 
the ability to be adaptable and bounce back from failure or upsets; 2) sensitivity to operations – paying 
special attention to those on the front-line who are doing a majority of the work; 3) deference to expertise 
– deferring to expertise (e.g., surgeons) rather than authority (e.g., administration); 4) reluctance to 
simplify – taking deliberate steps to create the most complete picture of a process/situation; 5) 
preoccupation with failure – treating any lapse or near miss as a symptom that there might be something 
wrong with the system.  These concepts, though apparently quite straightforward, are oftentimes 
challenging to embed in a culture that has yet to recognize their centrality in affecting human 
performance. 
Quality Improvement Techniques:  Six Sigma and LEAN 
Once a process is identified, techniques can be applied to optimize its performance either by reducing 
wasteful components or reducing variation in the product. Six Sigma (SS) refers to a method and set of 
tools with the objective of identifying errors and eliminating variation. This approach, developed by 
Motorola and further popularized by General Electric, aims to improve quality by identifying the root causes 
of defects using a data-driven, statistical framework to reach predetermined value targets. Armed with a set of 
tools, SS teams sponsor, manage, and complete projects in many complex environments. A vital component of 
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SS is the ability to meet customer-defined specifications and expectations. As such, it becomes essential to define 
a problem in accordance with what a customer needs. The Six Sigma concept comes from the goal of 3.4 defects 
per million opportunities which would be 6 standard deviations.  This is the level of safety seen in aviation and 
the nuclear power industry. By contrast, we accept a common bile duct injury rate during cholecystectomy of less 
than 0.5%    That is only a 2-sigma process. Six Sigma requires skilled facilitators (“Black Belts,”) and can take 
months for a project to move to fruition. 
On the other hand, LEAN involves front line driven, rapid cycle changes to reduce non-value-added activities. It 
is based on the Japanese word, Kaizen, roughly translating into a “change for better.” This is a central 
precept in Lean and reflects the fundamental idea of a continuous iterative model for gradual 
improvement to satisfy the customer’s needs. By producing only what is desired in the shortest time 
possible, it arranges and streamlines all essential processes to improve workflow.  LEAN identifies seven 
“Deadly Wastes:” Overproduction; Excess inventory; Defects; Unnecessary transport; Unnecessary human 
motion; Over -processing; Waiting.  Process mapping quickly identifies these opportunities, changes, often based 
on front line input, are instituted, and the new cycle reevaluated. 
LEAN and Six Sigma are sometimes used interchangeably – they are in fact complementary – lean 
focuses on waste, and Six Sigma aims to reduce variability of the more efficient process. 
Root Cause Analysis (RCA) 
Surgeons have been involved in variants of RCAs when investigating a bad outcome (morbidity or 
mortality – M&Ms); in fact, some M&Ms use this format to attempt to identify the “root” of the problem. 
Harm events can occur not only secondary to the pathophysiology of the disease or patient related 
conditions but rather to system failures or process issues where errors are prone to occur in complex 
environments where multiple factors are at play at once (e.g. operating room).  However, the answers are 
not always immediately apparent and a deeper dive into the data is required.  RCAs should begin with the 
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premise that we don’t know the true cause of a problem.  Because medical care involved multiple 
disciplines, all relevant specialties should participate and “rank” is checked at the door. 
The first step in an RCA is to collect the data (this can be a long and tedious process). It is also important 
to note that data can have flaws and careful attention should be placed in ensuring the accuracy of the data 
being analyzed. Next, developing a Cause and Effect diagram, also called Fishbone or Ishikawa diagram. 
This organization of thinking helps identify the “Effect” as the main outcome. The Fishbone is organized 
into basic categories – Materials, Methods, Measurements, Machines, Environment and Personnel. Each 
potential cause is placed within a category and 5 series of “why” questions will begin to identify a core or 
root cause.  Interventions then focus on these upstream conditions. 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
Whereas RCA, by nature is retrospective, FMEA allows a prediction of where a failure might occur and 
how likely it is to reach the patient.  Originally developed by the military, and subsequently applied by 
NASA, FMEA maps a process and identifies where it could fail.  Failure has three quantifiable 
components: How likely is it to occur (Frequency); How likely will the failure be missed 
(Undetectability); and How dangerous is the outcome (Severity).  Each of the components is ranked on a 
1-10 scale and multiplies together to create the Risk Priority Number or Index (RPN, RPI.)  Interventions 
are then designed for those components with the highest RPI and the process repeated to identify new or 
emerging threats.  FMEA is highly intensive as even a simple process, will be dissected into hundreds of 
steps and potential failure points.  Fortunately, only a handful rise to the level of high risk.  In some cases, 
other quality improvement tools such as RCA and human factors can be employed to create solutions.   
Avoiding Drift: Leadership Behaviors that Sustain Performance 
We have provided example of numerous Performance Improvement tool and techniques to diagnose and 
intervene systematic problems threatening the safety and quality of health care. None of these will be 
successful with an understanding of leadership in both achieving these goals and sustaining performance 
over time.  There are key components to successful leadership: building a culture which values safety and 
efficiency; properly incentivizing personnel; developing a forward-thinking organization which is proactive 
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rather than reactive. Each of these begins with a leader’s honest self-assessment – if you aren’t reflecting 
your true ideals, you will not be seen as genuine, even if the changes you support are correct.  Next is an 
understanding of what motivates people, and it’s not always money.  We all want to reach Maslow’s level 
of “self-actualization.”  This means feeling valued, being given the opportunity to do the things that bring 
a sense of fulfilment and competence, and to have a clear idea what the rules are.  Many organizations send 
mixed messages and under-communicate long term goals and institutional values.  They may respond to 
the publicly reported metric of the day, rather than remind team members that outcomes are best when 
everyone sees, understands and pulls in the same direction.  Leadership skills can be developed, and 
organizations should recognize and support emerging leaders, including equipping them with an 
understanding of the full range of Performance Improvement tool available to them. 
Conclusion 
Surgeons are in an excellent position to lead the transition to increasingly safe, high quality, affordable care.  
Surgeons are comfortable with ambiguity, are not hesitant to take on new challenges, and have a strong 
vision of what is right for the patient.   By understanding how PI can be incorporated into our everyday 
practices, we will not only improve our patient’s experiences, but also our own job satisfaction. 
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT 
It has been nearly 20 years since the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report To Err Is Human: Building a 
Safer Health System concluded that 44,000-98,000 Americans die each year as a result of preventable 
medical errors.1 This was followed in 2001 by the IOM report Crossing the Quality Chasm, which 
focused more broadly on the healthcare system and provided a practical framework for improving the 
delivery of care.2 Although the IOM reports led to improved public awareness and dramatic policy 
recommendations,  improvements in patient safety, quality and value are modest; patients continue to 
experience preventable harm through system and human errors and delivery of care remains costly and 
inefficient.3,4,5 In the United States, per-capita health care expenditures surpass that of every other country 
in the world, and is nearly twice that of other high-income countries.6 Attempts to address the rising costs 
of healthcare have largely focused on payment reform; cutting costs by reducing payments and penalizing 
suboptimal outcomes. These have failed as the metrics incented do not necessarily reflect a path to 
efficiency and high reliability. A more impactful approach, is to improve how care is delivered. Since 
greater than 20% of health care expenditures can be attributed to inefficiencies in the healthcare system,7,8 
eliminating errors, defects and waste not only improves the quality and safety of the care that is provided, 
but also saves money.  
  
Healthcare delivery is complex, driven by advances in medical science and new technologies, 
multidisciplinary care, and increasingly diverse sites of service. Within the surgical realm, many adverse 
events are not related to operative technical errors, but from defects that occur throughout the 
perioperative period.9,10 Quality improvement efforts must aim to improve systematically these processes 
of care. Increasingly, medicine benefits from lessons learned in other industries. 
 
The systematic approach to quality improvement began with Walter Shewhart during the 1920s at 
Western Electric’s Hawthorne plant in Cicero, Illinois (Figure 1).11,12  Western Electric manufactured 
hardware for Bell Telephone, and its large Hawthorne plant, became famous for its studies in employee 
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productivity and the origin of the “Hawthorne effect.” Shewhart, regarded as the father of statistical 
process control, recognized that reducing process variation both improved quality and decreased costs.  
Initially, Western Electric had no means of monitoring or effectively managing variation. Instead, they 
relied on trained inspectors to ensure defective products did not reach their customers, a costly and 
inefficient process. It was Shewhart’s development of the statistical process control (SPC) chart that 
provided a visual representation of variation (Figure 2).13 An SPC chart builds on a simple run chart by 
adding a measure of variation that differentiates between what we now refer to as common-cause 
variation (random variation) and special cause-variation (non-random variation). This has important 
implications for how we interpret data and manage quality.  When only common-cause variation is 
present in an SPC chart, the process is said to be in “control” and its performance going forward is 
predictable. Time and effort should not be spent trying to explain the data since it is randomly distributed 
and inherent to the process. In contrast, special-cause variation is unexpected. It should be investigated, 
and its etiology understood.       
 
 W. Edwards Deming and Joseph Juran, like Shewhart, also began their careers at Western Electric.  
Deming learned statistical process control from Shewhart and promoted statistical methodologies to 
improve quality.  He also popularized the Shewhart Cycle, later known as the Deming or Plan-Do-Study-
Act (PDSA) Cycle. In 1947, Deming was assigned by the Allied Forces to post war Japan to apply his 
sampling techniques for the Japanese Census. While there, he taught Japanese industrial engineers and 
managers statistical methods and how to improve system-wide quality.14 These techniques would later 
become the basis for Total Quality Management (TQM). Similarly, Juran was invited by the Union of 
Japanese Scientists and Engineers (JUSE) to lecture on managerial concepts for quality improvement. He 
emphasized the human dimension to quality and is known for applying the Pareto Principle or 80-20 rule: 
80% of problems come from 20% of causes. Both men are recognized for having played a significant role 
in Japan’s subsequent quality revolution and financial recovery.  
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Further growth to the quality movement in Japan during the 1950s were driven by Kaoru Ishikawa, 
professor of engineering at Tokyo University, and Taiichi Ohno, an industrial engineer working for 
Toyota. Ishikawa learned the basics of statistical quality control from the Americans, and promoted broad 
engagement in quality by all employees, not just management. This bottom-up approach to quality 
improvement was exemplified by his development of the Quality Circle.15  He also created the Ishikawa 
(fishbone) diagram for problem solving, and for introducing the Seven Basic Tools of Quality: Ishikawa 
diagram, check sheet, SPC chart, histogram, Pareto chart, scatter diagram, and stratification or flowchart. 
Ohno is regarded as the pioneer of the Toyota Production System which morphed into LEAN. His model 
of seven wastes continue to help organizations identify non-value-added activities. These seven wastes 
are: transportation, inventory, motion, waiting, over-processing, over-production and defects. Ohno also 
introduced the problem-solving technique of asking “why” five times to understand the root cause of a 
problem.16  
 
 Prior to the 1980s, the Japanese quality revolution was relatively unnoticed in the US. With the oil 
embargos of the 1970s and the need for fuel efficient and dependable cars, the US automobile industry 
had to improve quality. They were losing market share to the higher quality and less costly automobiles 
coming from Japan. The 1980 NBC broadcast, “If Japan Can, Why Can’t We?” highlighted the 
innovative products coming from Japan, ironically based on the methods of American W. Edwards 
Deming. US industries sent teams to Japan to study the success of companies like Toyota, and Deming’s 
teachings were in high demand from US industries including the then Big Three automakers. This marked 
a new era in the US for quality management systems, now incorporating, Total Quality Improvement 
(TQM), LEAN, and Six Sigma. 
 
Quality Management Systems 
18 
 
Quality management systems include philosophical concepts and practical tools; their implementation 
requires effective leadership to guide and sustain change. Although many approaches have been 
popularized, there are three major systems; 
 
1. Total Quality Improvement (TQM) is a comprehensive approach to quality improvement and 
management tracing its origin to statistical process control.  It is derived from Total Quality 
Control (TQC) developed by Japanese industries and the concepts of Deming, Juran, Ishikawa, 
and others. TQM promotes “total” organizational engagement in quality, cycles of continuous 
quality improvement, and the Seven Basic Tools of Quality. Popular in the 1980s and 1990s, it 
has since been largely replaced by other frameworks, such as Lean and Six Sigma.   
2. LEAN references the Toyota Production System (TPS). As defined by the Lean Enterprise 
Institute, “Lean is a set of concepts, principles and tools used to create and deliver the most Value 
from the Customers’ perspective while consuming the fewest resources and fully utilizing the 
skills and knowledge of those who do the work.”17   
3. Six Sigma was developed by Motorola in the 1980s and later popularized by General Electric to 
reduce variation, harkening back to the earlier work of Shewhart. Heavily reliant on statistical 
control, Six Sigma relies on a team of experts with an understanding of experimental design and 
applied statistics to identify and eliminate sources of variability.  
 
Systems Engineering 
Systems engineering draws on a broad range of approaches to improve quality, safety, efficiency, 
productivity, and service. It includes quality management strategies such as Lean and Six Sigma, 
statistical process control, multiple engineering techniques, queuing theory, high-reliability approaches, 
human-factors engineering, complexity science, modeling and simulation, and safety tools that include 
Root-Cause Analyses (RCAs) and Failure Modes and Effect Analyses (FMEAs). (Figure 3). 
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Applications in Healthcare 
A systematic approach to quality improvement in healthcare offers an opportunity to improve quality and 
efficiency while decreasing costs.  
 
In 2005, the IOM partnered with the National Academy of Engineering (NAE) to apply systems-
engineering tools to healthcare.21 In  2009 a report followed from the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality (AHRQ) entitled Industrial and Systems Engineering and Health Care: Critical Areas of 
Research22.  Subsequently a summary of recommendations was made to  President  Barak Obama from 
the Council of Advisors on Science and Technology entitled Better health Care and Lower Costs: 
Accelerating Improvement through Systems Engineering (Figure 4).4  Despite these efforts and data 
suggesting that systems engineering techniques have been associated with significant improvements in 
healthcare quality and efficiency, these tools remain underutilized. Their adoption has been hindered by 
multiple barriers, including inadequate access to relevant data and analytics, health professionals not 
trained to think analytically about the delivery of healthcare, and industrial and systems engineers without 
enough knowledge of the healthcare industry.4,23  Nonetheless increasing numbers of leading 
organizations are successfully employing QI/PI tools in their daily operations. These include the 
ThedaCare system in Wisconsin18, Virginia Mason in Seattle19, and Seattle Children’s Hospital.20  
 
Healthcare in the United States is complex, and its outcomes are heavily reliant on both the individual 
provider and the delivery system in which they are embedded. The same is true for the practice of 
surgery, where the errors in patient care occur throughout the entire perioperative period, yet systems-
based improvement strategies have not been widely adopted. This is likely to change as the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and insurers incentivize the value of care provided24,25 
Physicians are a natural fit to lead these efforts; in order to do so they must understand data and its 
management as well as adopt systems-based improvement strategies. 
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MEASURING AND ANALYZING DATA 
It has often been said that you can’t fix it if you don’t measure it.  In modern parlance, that includes being 
able to analyze what is measured to understand it.  Data are being collected in troves, and increasingly by 
surgeons themselves.  The day has arrived when surgeons must identify what is important to measure, 
measure it, and then analyze the data to continuously improve the care being provided.  While many 
might say that they didn’t go into surgery to crunch numbers, the modern surgeon must include analytical 
skills in his/her quiver, including the ability to use readily available analytical software.27,28,29,30 Current 
versions of Excel spreadsheets include remarkably advanced graphing and analytical tools.31  Many of 
these will be identified in this section as (Tab Name/ Menu Name) which represents the Tabs at the top 
of an Excel spreadsheet and the Menu Bar that is presented when a Tab is selected.  Occasionally, a third 
term is included to indicate a sub-selection in Excel.   
Although this section focuses on the use of Excel, there are many analytical programs.  A comprehensive 
presentation of techniques and methods of measurement and analysis is beyond the scope of this review.  
For those interested in more advanced methods, an extensive presentation can be found in32     Fortunately, 
these advanced methods can be connected directly to Excel using software called “R” and a “link” named 
R-Commander (RCmdr).33 (“R” can be downloaded at no cost from https://cran.r-project.org.)  
Understanding Data34  
Most surgeons were not trained to understand objectively data and the methods necessary to analyze 
them.  Most data of clinical usefulness will be either a continuous measurement (with a decimal point 
perhaps) or a discrete count (frequency).  In either case, if the data were measured again, the result would 
likely not be exactly the same.  In other words, data are uncertain.  This variation can be due to the 
property being measured or to the measurement technique itself.  As the number of independent 
measurements increases, estimates of the amount of variability can be obtained by the standard deviation, 
and an estimate of the variability of the average result (central tendency) can be obtained using the 
standard error of the mean.    Further, measurement tools may not be accurately calibrated, resulting in 
results that are consistently a little bit off.  This difference between actual and measured/estimated is 
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known as bias.  This “error” (bias) is additive to the “error” attributed to variability.  Proper 
understanding of data sets includes an estimate of the “central tendency” (mean or median), the amount of 
variability (standard deviation) and the amount of bias.35,36 
Data sets aren’t perfect.  In addition to measurement error, there are often errors in data entry.  These may 
be identifiable visually by examining the data or are recognized by searching for values that are outside of 
the expected range.  Excel has built in functions that allow searching a large spreadsheet to identify high 
or low values, blanks, redundancy, etc.  (Home/Conditional Formatting/Highlight Cells Rules).  Often 
data have been saved in “text” format, even though they appear to be numbers.  This can be converted 
using the right click function and selecting Format.  When a column of text data contains more than one 
element (such as first and last name) or only a portion of an entry is needed (e.g. last four digits of SSN), 
this is accomplished with (Data/Test to File). 
All relevant data should be aggregated in a single spreadsheet.  Extraneous data must be removed or 
moved to a separate sheet within an Excel workbook.  Although it is tempting to make spreadsheets 
“pretty” with colors, subsections, etc., these often interfere with the ability to analyze the data and should 
be avoided.  A simple spreadsheet with titles of data fields in the top row and uninterrupted columns of 
data beneath is optimal.  The column names should likewise be simple without symbols.  If data will be 
“pushed” into more advanced analytical software, such software often is “case-sensitive” and as such, 
unforgiving.  Names for data columns in Excel should be selected with this in mind- simple, no symbols, 
and lower case. 
Large datasets can be “sliced and diced” using (Insert/Pivot Table).  This allows totals, standard 
deviation, and other data characteristics to be determined across numerous dimensions, allowing a 
detailed “aggregate” view of the data, including subsets.   
Visualizing Data. 
 The human eye (and brain) has an incredible ability to recognize patterns and differences.37   Therefore it 
is essential to begin the analysis of surgical data by creating graphs.38 Excel has a wide range of advanced 
graphing capabilities (Insert/Charts).  Line graphs are created by selecting the (Scatterplot) option, 
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which also can create linear regression outcomes within the graph.  Many analytical methods “fit” a linear 
equation to a set of data.  The human eye and brain can recognize even small deviations from a straight 
line, particularly when the line is horizontal.  Additionally, most statistical methods require and assume 
that data can be fitted to a normal distribution (bell-shaped curve), but they are often satisfactory if the 
data are only symmetrical.  This is seldom the case in human biology.  If the human eye can readily 
identify a “tail” extending to one side or to the other, the data may require alternative analytical methods.   
A frequency distribution can be created in Excel using (DataAnalysis/Histogram).  This requires 
identifying a “bin” size.  Look at the range of the data.  If there are 100 or so data points, divide the 
maximum by ten to create bin size.  If there are 1000 or so, divide by 20.  If larger, increase the number of 
bins accordingly.  The software will create a frequency distribution graph.  Ideally, this should show a 
symmetrical, single peak.  Look for a tail to one side (skewed) or two peaks (bimodal).   
Once visualized, data can be examined more closely using an “add-in” found in Excel named “Data 
Analysis” and found in “Analysis Tool Pack” (File/Options/Add-Ins/AnalysisToolPack).  Within Data 
Analysis, “Descriptive Statistics” performs the “common” statistical tests on each variable in the dataset.  
A few simple “rules of thumb” simplify understanding.  First, look to see if the mean and the median are 
the same.  If they are, the variable is probably “normal”.  Next, look at the “skewness”.  If the skewness is 
more than +/- 0.5 the data are probably not normal.  If greater than +/-1.0, they are definitely not normal.  
Look at the minimum and maximum and ask if these are reasonable values.  If not, an outlier may be 
present.  Then examine the range.  If it is more than 50% greater than four times the standard deviation, 
there are outliers or non-normality. 
Hazards of Cause and Effect Analysis 
Some cause and effect (outcome) studies are prospective, but most are still retrospective (because they’re 
easier and don’t take many years for results).39,40 Prospective, randomized studies control for all of the 
variables in life except those being studied.  Therefore, the resulting outcome MUST be due to the 
treatment.  Just because a retrospective study is comparing the same treatment and variables does NOT 
mean that the same conclusion of cause and effect can be made.  Truly, a retrospective study can never 
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FULLY determine cause and effect, only some ASSOCIATION.  Why is this?  Because a retrospective 
study has the variables and data already determined and probably not for the reasons currently being 
studied.  Many of the variables in the dataset are actually the RESULT of something else.  In other words, 
the purported CAUSE variables and RESULT variables are not measured and so not in the dataset.  A 
classic textbook example is the association of arm length with reading skill.  As arm length increases, so 
does reading skill.  Cause and effect?  No, both are the result of age.  Fifty years ago, Austin Bradford 
Hill wrote a set of criteria for determining the likelihood of a cause and effect relationship (Bradford Hill 
criteria).  While these have been tweaked and modified over the years, the fundamental principles are the 
same.  To be able to say there is a cause and effect relationship, one must convincingly demonstrate that a 
cause and effect relationship is both reasonable and likely.  Unfortunately, no analytics software can 
ascertain reasonableness and logic.  If the relationship isn’t immediately reasonable, then it probably isn’t 
cause and effect.  Many retrospective wound infection studies, for example, identify factors that “cause” 
wound infections that on close look are very unlikely to be causative.   
Correlation/Collinearity.  
 The origin of data in retrospective datasets leads to yet another problem.  Because many of the variables 
are actually the result of something else, unmeasured, they are often very highly correlated and collinear.  
If highly correlated variables are all left in the analysis, in effect, the unmeasured causative variable is 
being included in the analysis MORE THAN ONCE, leading to an excessive weighting.  Collinearity can 
be identified by performing a correlation matrix.  Correlation and covariance are very closely related 
concepts, but correlation is simpler and more understandable.  Correlation between two variables can 
range from -1 (perfectly correlated but in the opposite direction) and +1 (perfectly correlated).  Zero 
means there is no correlation between those two variables. 
The (Data/Data Analysis/Correlation) module will create a correlation matrix (a 2x2 table of all 
possible comparisons in the selected data).  If all of the input variables as well as the outcome variable are 
selected, two different analyses are performed simultaneously: identifying possible adverse collinearity 
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in the input variables and identifying possible meaningful association between input and outcome 
variables.41 
 What ins an “Independent” Variable?42  
Surgical outcome studies often contain the word “independent”.  Independently predicts, independent 
variables, etc.  But independent has two very different meanings, depending on the context.  Input 
variables are called “independent”, while the outcome variable is named “dependent”.  But the 
independent variables may not, in fact, be mathematically independent of each other.  And they certainly 
aren’t necessarily “independent predictors”.  Mathematical independence requires an analysis that 
demonstrates it (see Correlation/Collinearity).  Prediction requires that the Bradford Hill criteria (or 
similar) are fulfilled.43 
Measures of Central Tendency and Dispersion.  
Central tendency is estimated by three metrics; mean (the mathematical average of the data), median (the 
middlemost value in a set of data), and mode (the most frequent item in the data set).44 In the case of a 
truly normal set of data, the three should be identical.  As a dataset becomes more “non-normal”, the 
mean becomes less representative of the central tendency, while the median continues to be meaningful.  
While useful in a few specific situations, the mode is not particularly helpful except in unimodal, normal 
datasets, in which the mean and median are still preferred.  The mean, median and mode are all 
determined in (Data/Data Analysis/Descriptive Statistics).  Even measuring the same object will not 
give the same result on a repeated basis, so all data contains “dispersion” around the central tendency.  
Traditionally, it was assumed that all data were “normal” (which is why the word normal is used).  The 
crudest measure of dispersion is the range (minimum value to maximum value).  It includes 100% of the 
data but provides little additional information.  The variance is the basic measure of dispersion, but it is 
not in the same units of measurement as the original data, so its square root, the standard deviation, is 
used.  The standard deviation applies to the dispersion of an entire dataset, essentially estimating the 
range expected for 95% of the data, with 2.5% expected to be larger or smaller.  This holds well if the 
dataset is normally distributed.  A similar term, standard error of the mean, applies to the expected 
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dispersion of the measure of central tendency, the mean.  It indicates how much the mean is expected to 
vary if the data are measured again.  While it can still be calculated, its true meaning tends to diminish as 
a dataset deviates from normality.  The range, variance, and standard deviation are all determined in 
(Data/Data Analysis/Descriptive Statistics).  Standard error of the mean (or simply standard error) must 
be calculated using a “cell-function” in Excel by dividing the standard deviation by the square root of “n”, 
the sample size.   
t-Test and Analysis of Variance 
 Modern statistics originated about 100 years ago as an extension of probability theory. The t-test was one 
of the first published statistical methods.45 It is limited in being able to compare two groups.  Although it 
is modestly resilient to non-normality of the data (robust), it is less flexible with very unequal sample 
sizes or marked differences in variances between the two groups of data. In principle, the t-test calculates 
a “pooled” standard error, representative of ALL of the data, on the null assumption that there is no 
difference.  If the difference in the means of the two groups is greater than two times the pooled standard 
error, there is less than 5% chance that the two means are from the same set of objects (p<0.05).  Several 
forms of t-test can be performed in Excel: paired samples, equal variance and unequal variance 
(Data/Data Analysis).  Paired samples can only be used when both measurements were obtained in the 
identical subjects.  Use of equal variance requires that the variances are known or shown to be equal and 
yields the same result as “unequal variance” in most instances. Therefore, it is usually safer to NOT 
assume equality. An alternative approach is to use “distribution-free” methods such as the Wilcoxon 
(unpaired) or Mann-Whitney (paired).   
It is uncommon in modern medical research to have only two groups.  While this is sometimes handled by 
doing a bunch of t-tests, this introduces a large potential for error as well as violating the statistical 
principle of independence.  The traditional method of handling multiple groups is to use Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA).  ANOVA is completely different from t-tests, as it is based on differences in the 
dispersion (variance) and not in the central tendency.  It assumes that all of the variances are normal and 
that the variances of individual subsets can be added together to get the variance of the entire set.  If this 
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assumption is correct, then ANOVA is an extremely powerful tool, allowing a wide range of subset 
analyses and comparisons as well as comparison of more complex methods, such as regression.   Several 
ANOVA methods are available in Excel.  (Data/DataAnalysis/ANOVA).  “Single Factor” is like 
performing a t-test for more than two groups (but using variance).  The two “Two Factor” methods allow 
analysis in two dimensions (such as diabetics/non-diabetics in one dimension and different prophylactic 
antibiotics in the other).  With and without replication is an important distinction.  “Replication” in 
statistics means measurements in different samples/subjects, not repeated measurement of the same 
sample.  ANOVA Two Factor with replication would be used if a single measurement (or the average 
of multiple measurements) was made in each patient.  ANOVA Two Factor without replication uses 
single measurements or the average of multiple repeated measures.  Note the distinction between 
“replication” and “repeated measures”.   As previously indicated, ANOVA is very sensitive to deviations 
from normality.  Many measurements in medicine involve time, waiting time, survival, length of stay, for 
example, and length of time is almost always exponential.  Many other clinical variables are similarly 
non-normal.  Often a suitable mathematical manipulation (such as the logarithm) will “transform” the 
data satisfactorily, allowing ANOVA.  If no suitable transform can be found, the Kruskal-Wallis test can 
be used. 
Regression, Classification and related methods 
Most surgical outcome studies utilize some variation of regression or classification methods.   
In brief, regression is a technique which determines a relationship between a set of input variables and an 
outcome that is an actual measurement (continuous variable).  It has numerous requirements and 
assumptions.  The result of a regression analysis is an equation that relates the inputs to the outcome.  
Statistical analysis of the regression utilizes a form of ANOVA.  Regression is a very old (and still 
relevant) technique, but modern high-speed computers have allowed the development of alternative 
methods that primarily address the failure to meet the assumptions of regression.46 These modern 
techniques are increasingly seen in the surgical literature and should be in the armamentarium of the 
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surgeon interested in outcome analysis.  A remarkably strong module for regression is found in Excel 
(Data/Data Analysis/Regression) 
Classification is similar to regression in concept but utilizes a binary (yes/no, lived/died, etc) type of 
outcome and very different mathematics.  Surgical outcome studies that address the factors related to 
post-op infection or pulmonary embolus, for example, use classification techniques.  Logistic regression 
has been the workhorse approach to classification studies, but once again modern computers have allowed 
the development of approaches that address the failure to meet the assumptions of logistic regression.   
Advanced Analytics 
  This section has addressed some basic concepts of statistics and some methods that are available in 
Excel.  In addition, it has introduced a few modern concepts of statistics as relevant to surgical outcome 
with references that provide more detailed explanations and methodologies for the interested reader.  The 
software “R”, previously mentioned, is arguably the most powerful statistical software currently 
available, and it’s free!  It links directly with Excel, allowing data in an Excel spreadsheet to be analyzed 
using an extensive roster of modern analytical methodologies.  A comprehensive introduction to “R” and 
its application to Health Systems Analytics and surgical outcomes can be found in.47 This reference 
contains a glossary of terms and a large number of primary references to important statistical and 
analytics concepts relevant to surgical outcome analysis. 
 
HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS IN SURGERY  
While much progress has been made in reducing adverse events in healthcare, the overall rate of errors 
remains high, even if not associated with death or significant injury.48 Moreover, among all areas in the 
healthcare setting, most adverse events are associated with surgical care.49 A 2013 review of 14 studies 
involving surgical adverse events found that unintended injury or complication occurred in about 14.4% 
of patients in which 5.2% of these events were potentially preventable.50 
Surgical teams are required to integrate with progressively complex technology, communicate and 
coordinate among several multidisciplinary team members with differing levels of expertise, problem 
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solve on the spot as unforeseen patient challenges arise, and manage cost and time limitations mandated 
by the organizational priorities.  
Historically, errors made in the surgical theatre have often been attributed to an individual practitioner’s 
ability and skill.51 However, by focusing only on human error we fail to address the number of 
contributing factors that create the conditions for errors to occur.  This view also neglects several factors 
that are vital for attaining safe and efficient performance in other high-risk industries. These include: 
organizational culture, teamwork and communication, physical layout, interface design and cognitive 
abilities. In high-risk/ high-reliability industries, these factors are often the focus of intervention.  
A systems safety or human factors approach, unlike that of many human-centered perspectives, suggests 
that error is often the result of a combination of various work environment factors. Accidents and adverse 
events in complex environments occur when multiple factors break down the existing barriers and defense 
mechanisms within a given system.52 Human factors approaches apply information about human behavior, 
cognition, limitations, and abilities to the design of systems and their components for safe and efficient 
use. 
In applying a systems safety approach in healthcare, several frameworks and conceptual models are 
available. Perhaps one of the most comprehensive, and well-established models is the Systems 
Engineering Initiative to Patient Safety (SEIPS) model, supported by the Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ).53  
The SEIPS model maintains that a person (e.g., surgeon, nurse, technician) performs a range of tasks that 
require the interaction of other team members, the use of various tools and technologies, and that these 
tasks are performed within a given physical environment under specific organizational conditions. It 
investigates factors impacting surgical performance within these six components (Figure 5).  None of 
these components stand alone, they are all part of an interacting system. Their interactions can produce 
different performance outcomes including safety, health, and quality of working life. Each of these factors 
impact surgical performance. 
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The Person 
A human factors approach does not focus on the errors made by a particular person; rather, human factors 
use knowledge about human behavior, attitudes, and cognitions to understand and redesign systems and 
processes so that errors are less likely to be made in the future. The person perspective focuses on the 
proactive identification of what fosters high quality surgical performance, rather than highlighting 
surgical mistakes and developing reactive methods to address these missteps.  Perhaps most central to 
mitigating threats to patient safety in surgery is an individual’s ability to detect and recover from failures 
in the system before they reach the patient .This skill can be described as error management, which Leval 
argues is a marker of surgical excellence.54  Wiegmann found in cardiac surgeons, 3.5 errors per case 
were made on average; however, most of these were detected and remedied before any harm to the patient 
occurred.51 Yang and colleagues documented an average of 11 errors occurred in each case, whereby 77% 
were intercepted by a circulating nurse and the remaining 23% were mitigated before an adverse event 
occurred.55  
Leadership is also important when girding a surgeon to act as a barrier to threats in the system. 
Historically, great surgeons were recognized based on their technical abilities, knowledge of the subject 
matter, and diagnostic expertise. However, nontechnical abilities such as effective communication and 
individual leadership style ultimately translate into improved patient safety and better outcomes.56 
Central to leadership is our ability to manage ourselves and our relationships with others. These skills 
have been described by Daniel Goleman as Emotional Intelligence.57 Emotional intelligence (EQ) consists 
of four domains: 1) self-awareness – the ability to read one’s own emotions and recognize their impact; 2) 
self-management – the ability to control one’s emotions and impulses and adapt to changing 
circumstances; 3) social awareness – the ability to sense, understand, and react to other people’s 
emotions; and 4) social skills – the ability to inspire others with a compelling vision and to help others 
develop by offering feedback and guidance. Emotional intelligence correlates with many of the 
competencies that contemporary medical curricula strive to deliver.58 Components can be quantified using 
platforms such as the Bar-on EQ-I,59 the Schutte Self-report Emotional Intelligence Test,60 and the Wong 
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and Law Emotional Intelligence Scale (WLEIS).61 No one person is strong in all components, and 
coaching programs can be designed based on the pattern.62 
 
Teamwork/Communication 
Practitioners do not work alone, there is a high degree of interaction within surgical practice. A “team” is 
often conceptualized as two or more individuals with task interdependencies who have a shared goal – in 
this case a successful surgery or ideal patient outcome. However, the complexity of healthcare 
necessitates that teams are dynamic, inconsistent, and have nebulous boundaries, at best. Teams often 
interact with one another, or have smaller sub-teams, and larger, overarching and overlapping teams. 
Teamwork has been extensively studied in the context of surgery, often focusing on a specific discipline 
and how to improve teamwork and performance in that unique discipline. Teamwork can cause or prevent 
adverse events, and much research has gone into improving teamwork .63  
The core competencies of teamwork are often disputed. Salas argues for the “big five” core competencies 
of teams which influence effectiveness: team leadership, mutual performance monitoring, backup 
behaviors, adaptability, and team orientation.64 Their model supports these five competencies with three 
coordinating mechanisms: shared mental models, closed loop communication, and mutual trust. 
Communication mechanisms are key. In the surgical domain, communication is inherently multi-modal, 
with individuals communicating not only face-to-face, but also via virtual and written means. 
Communication failures happen often in the operating room.65 In the cardiovascular operating room, 
Cohen found that 17.4% of all flow disruptions were purely communication-based.66 Some research has 
indicated that communication failures are largely verbal failures and often involve a surgical attending.67 
Nonverbal communication by facial expressions is inhibited by surgical masks and the need to 
concentrate on the surgical field. Common interventions that can alleviate communication failures include 
team training,68 checklist implementation and team briefings,65,69 and implementing stricter protocol-
driven communication.70 Implementing a protocol-driven communication (similar to a sterile cockpit in 
aviation) decreased frequency of communication issues from 11.5 per case to 7.3 per case, on average. 
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Interventions for communication failures (e.g., team training and checklists) are also common for other 
teamwork competencies. One prominent approach is TeamSTEPPSTM, developed by the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and Department of Defense (DoD).71 The TeamSTEPPSTM 
curriculum is heavily influenced by the “big five” core competencies of teamwork, and includes 
assessment of the organization’s readiness for change, training, implementation, and sustainment. The 
tools and strategies include briefings and debriefings, cross-monitoring, a two-challenge rule, and handoff 
guidelines. Handoffs include patient information transfer and are prime instances for communication 
failures – handoffs are often varied in function, content, and practice.72 Handoff mnemonics can support 
provider memory. More than 20 mnemonics are being used and tested in various settings73 the most 
frequently employed SBAR, standing for Situation, Background, Assessment, and Recommendation.74 
This is frequently used in nursing, there is often little standardization across departments or hospitals. and 
there are cultural challenges to ingraining these approaches that need to be addressed concomitantly. 
The TeamSTEPPSTM curriculum includes the importance of organizational cultural change, to the other 
interventions supporting team functioning. 
 
Tasks 
Several studies have investigated the role of surgical task factors (e.g., job demands such as workload, 
time pressure, cognitive load, and attention) on performance and safety.53 Physical workload can be 
excessive with prolonged muscular load, awkward and constrained postures, and/or repetitive 
movements75 It is further impacted by task duration and strength requirements. As operative procedures 
become more complex, surgeons are at a greater risk of work-related injury.  In laparoscopic surgery, 
muscular fatigue from prolonged and awkward surgical postures has been implicated in physical 
symptoms such as neck and back pain, as well as repetition injuries in the hand and elbow.76  
Cognitive load is the proportion of attentional resources demanded by the tasks. Tasks that are more 
difficult are associated with higher workload, leaving little or no spare attention to respond appropriately 
to new or unexpected events, increasing the likelihood of errors.77,78  
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There are several tools to measure mental workload; one of the most widely used (subjective) instruments 
is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration-Task Load Index (NASA-TLX).79 Recently, 
healthcare researchers developed a new version of the NASA-TLX designed for surgery called the 
surgical task load index (SURG-TLX).80 Studies investigating workload using both the NASA-TLX and 
the SURG-TLX suggest there is a positive relationship between workload and errors in performance. For 
example, increased extraneous mental and physical demands were associated with decreased suturing 
performance.78  
In addition to detriments in surgical performance, workload issues have been shown to relate to physician 
burnout.81 While there are multiple factors that contribute to physician burnout including inherent 
resilience, high workload due to the menial clerical tasks and documentation in the EHR are a major pain 
point. A time-motion study involving direct observation of over 50 physicians found that the average 
physician spent 49% of their time completing bookkeeping tasks. Moreover, physicians spent twice as 
long on EHR-related tasks than they did on clinical work.82  
Several solutions have been suggested to decrease harmful task related factors in the surgical 
environment. Recent literature has demonstrated the positive impact of intraoperative targeted stretching 
micro breaks (TSMBs) on surgeons’ experienced pain and fatigue, physical functions, and mental 
focus.83,84 Perhaps more common, however, is the introduction of a checklist to mitigate errors during 
stressful situations. When well-designed and implemented under the correct circumstances, checklists can 
be incredibly useful.84 However, when designed or implemented inappropriately, checklists can cause 
additional issues such as “checklist fatigue”.85  
Other interventions focus on physician workload and burnout. Podnos found that introducing another 
healthcare team member to assist with non-clinical duties and tasks could help reduce the hours and 
workloads of surgeons in training. For example, when health technicians worked a 40-hour week 
conducting clerical work and selected patient care activities, surgical intern work hours decreased by 17 
hours, allowing for more time in the operating room.86 Major organizations, such as the American College 
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of Surgeons has taken a leadership role in addressing the multiple factors associated with burnout and 
surgical practice. 
 
Tools/Technologies 
Participation in any surgical environment requires interacting with complex tools and advanced (or 
sometimes antiquated) technologies. While tools and technology can improve surgical performance and 
patient care, they are sometimes poorly designed and can increase errors by creating inefficient work 
processes. For example, medical devices that are similar in design and purpose may not always function 
with the same user inputs (e.g., turning one control element to the left for manufacturer “A” and turning 
an identical looking control element to the right for manufacturer “B”).87 In fact, nearly half of all recalls 
of medical devices are due to design flaws, with certain devices being associated with dangerously high 
use-error rates.51  
Medical device usability testing is one approach to help mitigate these design flaws. Recent guidance 
from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) addresses many of these issues; however, it is oftentimes 
unfeasible to fully investigate the usability of every device prior to its implementation.88 Additionally, 
even when devices are well-designed, they can have unforeseen impacts on other work processes in the 
system. The introduction of new technology can introduce a range of unanticipated inefficiencies and 
risks.89 
Prior to the implementation of new tools/technology, it is imperative that surgeons and other team 
members are prepared and trained on the potential hazards and new procedures associated with the tools. 
There is a need for training to be included anytime that a new tool or piece of technology is implemented 
in the surgical system. Some have argued that stringent regulations including audits of initial performance 
and comparison of standard approaches should be required if new tools/technologies. The use of FMEA, 
discussed later in this manuscript can provide preemptive identification of risk points. In appropriate 
situations, to training these skills involves the use of medical simulation. Simulators can be used to 
investigate the effectiveness of new instruments with no impact to actual patients.90  
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Physical Environment  
Within the OR, the “environment” refers to the physical space, equipment, and all the individuals within 
that space. While most OR team members have adapted to the ever-increasing complexity of the surgical 
theatre, several factors have the potential to impact surgical performance and patient safety. These include 
lighting, temperature, noise, traffic and physical layout of the room.  
OR layout and noise are strong influencers on surgical performance.91 As technology has become better 
designed for efficient monitoring and treatment of surgical patients, the number of instruments, 
equipment, and connecting wires has only increased. Despite advances in technology, the size and 
architectural layout of the OR typically remains unchanged. This has led to cluttered equipment, and 
entangled lines and wiring (known as the spaghetti syndrome).92 When coupled with the challenge of 
working with several multidisciplinary team members (oftentimes including medical students and other 
visiting observers) the cluttered layout of the OR restricts team member movement, hinders the access 
and maintenance of lines and wires, and increases the risk of accidental line disconnection.   Traffic in 
and out of the OR during surgery has been found to distract the operating surgeon.93 
In a study investigating workflow disruptions in the cardiovascular OR, researchers found that issues in 
the operating room layout and design contributed to about 20% of the disturbances. Of these issues, 
inadequate use of space, wrongful positioning of furniture and poor placement of equipment were most 
commonly observed.66 Researchers suggest that decluttering, standardizing room layout, making use of 
under-utilized spaces for organization of equipment/supplies, and eliminating wiring through the use of 
wireless technology can help to mitigate clutter in the room.92  
Over-cluttered environments containing multiple team members and numerous pieces of equipment, each 
with their own alarm/alerting systems can lead to increased noise and impact outcomes in the OR. One 
study found that patients whose operative environments had higher sound levels were more likely to 
develop a surgical-site infection.94 In another study, OR noise above 80 decibels was associated with a 
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significant increase in medical errors.70 Bear in mind however, that completely eliminating noise in the 
OR is not only impractical but is unlikely to be accepted by the surgical team members.  
Healthcare has more recently applied the “sterile cockpit rule” used in aviation to reduce nonessential 
activities and discussion during periods of high workload. For example, Wadhera and colleagues 
introduced a structured sterile cockpit-driven protocol in cardiac surgery and saw significant reductions in 
communication breakdowns.70  
 
Organizational Conditions  
Most organizations have accepted the idea that whenever a human is involved with a process, error is 
inevitable. However, there are high reliability (HROs)organizations that operate in high-risk 
environments that continue to function at incredibly safe levels. Wieck and Sutcliffe found that HROs 
design work systems to anticipate risks and recover from errors when they occur. They do this through 
their commitment to five values/actions: 1) commitment to resilience – the ability to be adaptable and 
bounce back from failure or upsets; 2) sensitivity to operations – paying special attention to those on the 
front-line who are doing a majority of the work; 3) deference to expertise – deferring to expertise (e.g., 
surgeons) rather than authority (e.g., administration); 4) reluctance to simplify – taking deliberate steps to 
create the most complete picture of a process/situation; 5) preoccupation with failure – treating any lapse 
or near miss as a symptom that there might be something wrong with the system.95 
The values and actions align well with the concept of safety culture in numerous organizations. 
Wiegmann and colleagues (2010) describe safety culture in healthcare as the “extent to which individuals 
and groups will commit to personal responsibility for patient safety, act to preserve, enhance, and 
communicate patient safety concerns, strive to actively learn, adapt and modify behavior based on lessons 
learned from mistakes, and be rewarded in a manner consistent with these values”.51  
Safety culture has been found to play a substantial role in patient safety and even surgical outcomes. In a 
cross-sectional study of 91 hospitals, those with better safety climate overall, had a lower incidence of 
publicly reported Patient Safety Indicators (PSI), such as deep vein thrombosis and surgical site infection. 
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Safety climate was measured using the Patient Safety Climate in Healthcare Organizations (PSCHO) 
survey focusing on senior managers’ engagement, organizational resources, overall emphasis to patient 
safety, unit safety norms, unit support and recognition for safety efforts and fear of blame / fear of shame. 
A 1 SD improvement in safety climate was associated with a 10% lower risk of a hospital experiencing an 
adverse PSI.96 With respect to surgical outcomes specifically, a recent study found that of seven hospitals 
included, those with higher surgical unit safety culture scores (measured using the Hospital Survey on 
Patient Safety Culture (HSOPS)) were associated with lower colon surgical site infection (SSI) rates.97  
Programs that support the synergy of hospital administrators, leaders and front-line providers improve 
safety culture in healthcare organizations. Interventions such as TeamSTEPPS,71 Comprehensive Unit-
based Safety Program (CUSP; a model for safety improvement focused on educating staff in the science 
of safety, identifying defects, engaging leaders, learning from defects and implementing teamwork 
tools)98 and executive walk rounds (frequent visits to patient care areas by individuals in leadership 
positions)99 positively influence safety culture.  
 
Human Factors Methods 
Much has been discussed regarding the different work system factors to be considered when applying a 
human factor approach to surgery. However, some may still be concerned with understanding how to 
identify threats to the system in general. Due to the diversity of the field, numerous methods have been 
applied in human factors approaches to improving safety and efficiency in healthcare. Data-collection 
methods used to investigate each of the systems factors described above include observations, interviews 
and questionnaires.  
Observational research identifies intra-operative flow disruptions   communication failures, poor layout 
and operating room design, and team performance during a process. Semi-structured interviews and focus 
groups are employed to understand organizational and individual factors that influence teamwork in 
surgery. Specific questionnaires investigate factors and attitudes that may influence surgical performance. 
Incident and event reporting systems are a rich source of data for diagnosing safety issues when analyzed 
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with a human factors lens, but must be coupled with a nonpunitive approach to self-disclosure.100 The 
methods listed here are not exhaustive. For a comprehensive review of human factors methods applied 
across several industries, see Stanton et al., 2017.101 
 
Conclusions 
A human factors or work system approach can be applied to surgery in many ways. The important 
takeaway message, is that measures of success cannot be determined by surgical skill alone. The work 
systems approach argues that the process of delivering care involves several moving parts, functioning in 
all levels. Integrating human factors and a work systems approach into performance improvement is key. 
Individuals must be considered in conjunction with their team, their environment, their tasks, their tools, 
and their organization. By understanding how all the parts fit together as a whole, a human factors and 
work systems approach allows for a more comprehensive understanding of surgery, and healthcare. 
 
QUALITY IMPROVEMENT METHODOLOGIES: LEAN AND SIX SIGMA 
Six Sigma 
Surgeons have been slow to incorporate industrial process control methods and other reliability 
techniques, but such methods have been applied successfully to many areas of importance in surgery 
including operating room processes impacting throughput, waiting times, and postoperative lengths of 
stay.102 Quality management tools can easily and effectively identify process control problems that occur 
on most surgical services. 
Six Sigma (SS) refers to a method and set of tools that utilize statistical analysis to measure and improve 
an organization’s performance, practices, and systems with the objective of identifying errors and 
eliminating variation.103 This approach, developed by Motorola and further popularized by General 
Electric, aims to improve quality by identifying the root causes of defects using a data-driven, statistical 
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framework to reach predetermined value targets. Armed with a set of tools, SS teams sponsor, manage, and 
complete projects in many complex environments such as healthcare. A vital component of SS is the ability to 
meet customer-defined specifications and expectations. As such, it becomes essential to define a problem in 
accordance with what a customer needs. 
A sigma (σ) is a measure of the standard deviation on each side of the mean in a normally distributed 
curve (Figure 1).104 Moving a statistical process to higher levels of Sigma results in a considerable reduction in 
errors and waste. Reducing the rate of errors or defects in processes to the level of six standard deviations 
from the mean (Six Sigma) or 3.4 defects per million opportunities (DPMO), is the goal of this method. 
This translates to a defect-free rate of 99.99966%. By contrast, the incidence of bile duct injury during 
laparoscopic cholecystectomy is in the range of 1 per 1,500, representing a “defect” rate of 95 DPMO.105 
At this level of quality, one would expect 20 commercial airline accidents daily. Six Sigma places a large 
emphasis on quantitative data analysis focusing on non-human factors to identify areas of variability and 
it’s causes. 
In general, there are foundational principles that guide the SS approach. For example, a core belief that all 
processes can be measured and improved.106 Success results from continuous efforts to achieve stable and 
predictable processes. Ongoing monitoring of statistical process control is crucial and, when processes are 
deemed out of control, a thorough causal assessment its essential. Furthermore, achieving sustained results 
requires full commitment from the entire organization particularly senior administration and leadership. For the 
most part, eliminating variation and standardizing processes saves money and improves quality in the long run. 
At the core of SS are the five problem-solving steps of Defining, Measuring, Analyzing, Improving, and 
Controlling (DMAIC) (Table 1) to incrementally improve an existing process. The DMAIC sequence is 
used as an iterative method to create a more efficient, stable, and sustainable system. 
Lean 
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Lean is an integrated system of principles, practices, and tools, developed by Toyota Motor Corporation, 
with a focus on eliminating waste and decreasing production time (cycle time).107 It aims to ensure the 
greatest value for the patient through the systematic identification and elimination of non-value-added 
activity. In contradistinction to Six Sigma, Lean focuses on improving the flow between processes rather 
than the processes themselves. The application of Lean principles engages all team members in 
developing solutions to problems, bottlenecks, and other barriers with a focus on the customer. A core 
concept of Lean is that most waste occurs in waiting rather than during the time spent producing the 
product or service.  
Lean has been successfully used in healthcare and, specifically, in the surgical environment.108,109 For 
example, by minimizing waiting time and other non-value-added activities across the entire episode of 
perioperative care resulting in reducing the patient’s duration of stay, infection rate, and overall 
costs.110,111,112,113,114 
The Japanese word, Kaizen, roughly translating into a “change for better”, is a central precept in Lean and 
reflects the fundamental idea of a continuous iterative model for gradual improvement to satisfy the 
customer’s needs. By producing only what is desired in the shortest time possible, it arranges and 
streamlines all essential processes to improve workflow. One of the guiding frameworks in Lean involves 
the 6S events after incorporating Safety more recently (Table 3). While Lean concepts are powerful, their 
application requires many of the tools used in Six Sigma for implementation. For example, a Pareto 
analysis tool is helpful in prioritizing where efforts should be focused (Figure 2) 
Anything other than the minimum amount of materials, equipment, parts, space, and labor time, which are 
essential to add value to the product is considered waste (Muda).115 The types of waste in Lean are listed 
in (Table 2). In addition, it is common to view non-utilized talent where individuals are not working to 
the “top of their license or training as a type of waste. 
The Integration of Lean and Six Sigma  
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Each of these frameworks have distinctive elements which complement each other (Figure 2). Used in 
combination, Lean Six Sigma (LSS) is a powerful quality management technique for improving the 
effectiveness of processes and the reduction of waste.116 As used in healthcare and other service 
industries, Lean Six Sigma can improve many production and transactional processes. The benefits of 
combining these methods uses a structured approach resulting in the engagement of frontline staff, a 
strong customer focus, the commitment of management, the use of process improvement tools, the 
creation of high-performing interdisciplinary teams, reductions in error and waste resulting in increased 
productivity and cost savings.117 Ideally, Lean methodology is usually introduced initially to improve 
efficiency and eliminate waste followed by Six Sigma methods for reducing variations and maintaining control of 
processes.  
Synergy exists between the drive for better quality of health outcomes and increased productivity. Poor 
outcomes negatively impact productivity. By translating the voice of the patient into operational 
requirements using LSS, healthcare organizations can exceed patient needs, expectations, and perceptions 
resulting in greater patient and provider satisfaction and workforce retention. This iterative process can be 
harnessed by learning healthcare organizations and leads to continuous improvements in quality and 
process.  
Successful Implementation of Lean Six Sigma: 
Implementation of LSS requires several complementary skills ranging from project management and data 
analysis to change and operations management.  As such, a team of knowledgeable, well-trained 
individuals are essential. The analytic activities necessary involve both strong statistical analysis 
capabilities as well as the use of visual, graphical elements.  
Access to raw quality data in real-time in the form of process measurements is also important (103, 104). 
Data that can be reliably followed over time to create statistical control charts with pre-defined upper and 
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lower control limits is advantageous. Such control limits are determined by the capacity of the process 
and identifies when processes are out of control. 
Lean Six Sigma projects can be difficult to implement, and many efforts fail from a lack of preparation, 
an insufficient time frame, or a lack of real commitment from senior leadership. Simply teaching the 
methods and tools of LSS to others, while important, is insufficient to achieve full implementation. 
Getting people to adopt new ways of working and not revert to the old system is often the most 
challenging aspect of implementation. Ongoing coaching of front-line staff is essential to ensure 
sustainability of effort.  
Sponsorship is essential for adoption. Without the full support of management, no change will stick. It is 
often the case that management wants improvement but is unwilling to fully commit resources and 
personnel buckling to pressures from other stakeholders who are not fully invested in the work or are 
threatened by change. Change management practices and techniques are key tools for implementing LSS 
and will go a long way toward ensuring success. 
Finally, complete and relentless communication throughout the implementation process is essential. 
Additionally, a full stakeholder value assessment will help identify potential sources of barriers and 
opposition to change. Communications must address the questions: Why are we doing this? Why now? 
What happens if we don't change? Fundamentally, the application of LSS to improve processes of care is 
a deliberate organizational act which should not be done lightly and which requires the help of systems 
engineers and quality experts as well as full commitment from all levels.  
ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS  
An important part of analyzing data is for it to help you identify problems or issues. These “issues” can be 
related to the data itself, the outcome or measure being looked at or simply a part of a major problem. 
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Whatever the problem is, it is important to learn to identify the main cause of the problem. A helpful tool 
in the assessment of problems is “Root Cause Analysis” or RCA.  
 
Surgeons have been involved in variants of RCAs when investigating a bad outcome (morbidity or 
mortality – M&Ms); in fact, some M&Ms use this format to attempt to identify the “root” of the 
problem.117 Harm events can occur not only secondary to the pathophysiology of the disease or patient 
related conditions but rather to system failures or process issues where errors are prone to occur in 
complex environments where multiple factors are at play at once (e.g. operating room). 
 
Understanding types of errors (or effects), frequency and origin of these issues can help an organization 
achieve systematic changes which can enhance patient safety initiatives and avoid worse outcomes. This 
concept was initially introduced by the father of healthcare quality (Avedis Donabedian in 1966). 
Certainly, healthcare organizations and patients have learned the importance of quality care and reporting 
outcomes.118  
 
The Joint Commission (TJC) expects meaningful improvements in patient safety at each organization by 
maintaining a culture of safety. Certainly, application of the RCA process can help achieve such status, 
with many VA systems actually submitting RCAs to state Patient Safety Centers.119,120 The TJC also 
provides a helpful guide like the “Root cause analysis in health care: tools and techniques from Joint 
Commission resources”.121  
 
RCAs can be used in a variety of settings, including understanding the root problem of a process (not 
necessarily a bad outcome), for example one might want to understand the root cause of why patient 
satisfaction surveys show low ratings for a particular office, or why an otherwise uncomplicated 
procedure has an unnecessary prolonged length of stay or cost, etc.122 Although relatively a new tool used 
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in healthcare, RCAs have been used widely in other high reliability industries to uncover issues, problems 
or potential problems.123  
Designing an RCA 
Whatever the variant used, there are some important concepts in RCAs. The purpose in general is to get to 
the root of the problem or issue. This process should be: 
-Impartial,  
-Multi-disciplinary, and  
-Bias-free.  
 
Ideally staff most familiar with the process being investigated should participate (e.g. a scrub tech if 
looking at reasons why an OR tray is too crowded).121,122 
 
The first step in an RCA is to collect the data (this can be a long and tedious process). It is also important 
to note that data can have flaws and careful attention should be placed in ensuring the accuracy of the data 
being analyzed. Next, developing a Cause and Effect diagram, also called Fishbone or Ishikawa diagram. 
Figure 6.) This organization of thinking helps identify the “Effect” as the main outcome.  
A Fishbone exercise is best carried out with an experienced facilitator. 
a) Write 4-6 main categories on a whiteboard, flip chart or electronic file 
b) Write the effect of the problem as the head of the fishbone 
c) List all possible causes of the problem (effect) within the main categories (listed in a). 
d) Brainstorm ideas on why these issues occurred 
e) Prioritize (based on expertise – and multidisciplinary recommendations) the most important 
causes 
f) Identify the top 3 causes and determine if additional steps are needed (e.g. more data 
collection, expert review, etc) 
g) Apply the 5 Why methodology on each item122  
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Fishbones lead to the 5 Whys 
Several “Causes” can contribute to such effect and it is rare to find just one cause but rather a 
combination of issues leading to the “effect” (or problem). It is important to isolate the major categories 
or contributors as the causal factors. Once all major factors are identified, sub-analysis if these factors can 
lead to identification of one or many root causes.122,123,124  
An example of such approach is detailed in Figure. Note that in this example, the effect or problem is a 
prolonged length of stay for uncomplicated appendectomies at a random facility. This effect is labeled in 
the head of the fish as “Delays”. The main categories and subcategories were brainstormed with other 
disciplines.  The lean six sigma process improvement team helped identify unique categories and targets 
for intervention leading to excessive delays in length of stay for these cases. Each facility or practice 
might have different priorities, therefore the importance of involving key stakeholders in these reviews. 
An important component of an RCA is to help identify “Why”. The 5 Why methodology is commonly 
applied, and its intent is to methodically brainstorm the causes of a problem. Most often than not, teams 
observe a symptom of the problem rather the problem itself. Asking why, helps to arrive to the answer 
with data. Most problems can be solved by further advancing the question 5 times, however one could get 
an answer even at the second why.122,124 Figure x is a 5 Whys template. In examining our long LOS in 
appendectomy, the fishbone and 5 why’s were complementary in identifying key issues. (Figures 7, 8, 9) 
An implementation team addressed each issue with key stakeholders in the emergency department, 
operating room, and nursing.  We were able to increase the outpatient appendectomy rate (length of stay 
less than 24 hours) from 23% in FY2015 to 53% by FY2017, including an overall reduction in total 
amount of hours spent in the hospital from presentation to the ED to discharge in excess of 11 hours in 
average: from 40 hours in FY2015 to less than 29 hours by FY2017 (data not published). 
Optimizing the outcome from an RCA 
Going through the RCA process in isolation is not enough.  The main driver for an accurate RCA is data. 
Many of the tools mentioned in the Data Management of this manuscript are utilized to identify outliers 
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and ensure reliability and reproducibility.125 Large databases (such as the American College of Surgeons 
National Surgical Quality Improvement Project – ACS-NSQIP) have checks and balances to support 
accuracy. NSQIP requires surgical registrars to receive ongoing training and periodic audits to ensure data 
accuracy and avoid inter-operator variability. All data should be reviewed by a second independent set of 
eyes to pick up inconsistencies. 
Because of preexisting bias, it is vital that an RCA be multidisciplinary. Even with a multidisciplinary 
approach, there may remain lack of institutional commitment to institute recommended changes.126  
 
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) 
“Failure is not an option.”  Attributed to Gene Kranz during Apollo 13 mission 
Although Kranz never uttered those words, the analysis and prevention of failure was brought to age 
during the Apollo program.127 FMEA was first developed by engineers and the military in the early 
1950’s to analyze how a process could go wrong after failure of a component of that process.128 Its use 
became more widespread during the technological expansion of aerospace and manufacturing in the 60’s 
and led to improved quality, less production downtime, and the ability to anticipate where failure might 
occur.  The prevention of individual process failure is a component of the “Swiss Cheese” model of harm 
– multiple failures must line up for the event to occur.129 
Medicine has been late to the game; however, the increasing technological complexity of patient care and 
the multiple opportunities for failure and harm makes its value even greater. FMEA is now being 
employed in high risk situations such as emergency intubation, vascular access and ECMO in the ICU 
and radiation therapy. 130 131,132,133 Site marking, and the Universal Protocol were outgrowths of FMEA in 
dealing with wrong site/ wrong side surgery.  Although it would seem logical to focus this modality in 
areas where adverse outcomes are significant, there is also improvement opportunities in routine, high 
volume activities such as patient flow through a clinic or assuring that inpatients consults are handled in 
an efficient and accurate manner. 134,135 
FMEA is proactive and predictive 
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Clinicians are most familiar with post hoc analysis.  The weekly M&M examines an undesirable outcome, 
and working backward, tries to identify what caused it and how it could be prevented.  Over the years, 
themes emerge centering around communication, individual judgment, and transitions of care.  
Significant adverse events undergo root cause analysis, a more structured, focused, retrospective review. 
FMEA looks at a process prospectively, and attempts to identify what could go wrong, how likely it is 
that the defect will be detected, and the significance of the impact to the final result.  It allows 
prioritization of the failures and can direct resources to where they will do the most good. 
It is important to understand that failures can occur in many forms and that safeguards must be designed 
to address the upstream and downstream results. (Figure 10) 
In the first examples, individual failure modes each have their own downstream effect.  The processes 
may be occurring simultaneously but are not directly linked or dependent on each other.  These must be 
analyzed and ameliorated separately.   The second example, is one of redundancy, where a single failure 
will not induce the undesired effect.  This can be seen in the design of safety devices on high pressure 
presses that require the operator to press 2 buttons simultaneously, one with each hand, to prevent crush 
injury.  The final situation is the most dangerous, analogous to a chain reaction.  A single failure sets off a 
cascade of effects. Each downstream effect must be detected and blocked separately. 
Organizing an FMEA 
As in any engineering process, specific steps are undertaken 
1. Assemble the team – members should be from multiple disciplines and includes experts in the 
subject matter. 
2. Graphically describe the process – for analyzing wrong side surgery, there are hundreds of 
touch points. multiple inputs and potential failure points, (Figure 11) is an example 
developed in examining the vulnerabilities that lead to a wrong site surgery. 
3. Conduct the analysis – this is an open brainstorming session that describes every conceivable 
failure, and its downstream effect. Working with experts, each failure is graded on the 
likelihood of occurrence (O), how detectable the failure is (D), and the severity of the result 
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(S).  Specific tables assess each of these on a 1-10 scale.  Detectability is inherently inverse – 
low detectability creates risk.  Multiplying these together creates a risk priority number or 
index (RPI) ranging from 1-1000. (Figure 12) Emphasis is initially placed on those failure 
points with the highest RPI.  A separate analysis of criticality is the sub-product of 
occurrence times severity which can be used to further differentiate among the outcomes. 
4. Identify interventions and how to measure effectiveness – because the goal is to prevent the 
failure, the intervention should have some measurable effect on the detectability or 
occurrence of the defect. (Figure 13.)  Severity can be mitigated, but it is best is the event is 
prevented. 
5. Assess success – implementation of process improvement will identify new vulnerabilities.  
A single fix may have multiple branching positive downstream effects.  The list should be 
reprioritized as new information becomes available.   
 
The process can seem overwhelming as each step is subdivided and multiple failure points identified.  In 
Niv’s FMEA of consultations in an Academic Medical Center, they initially identified 11 steps.  Each of 
those steps were further analyzed and 80 specific failure points identified.135 Of these 80, 3 rose to the top 
by RPI, and allowed focused intervention.  Howard’s review of Rapid Sequence Intubation similarly 
identified 104 potential failure points in in 44 subprocesses.  Although 35% were considered major, their 
occurrence was low and eventually 5 effective interventions were instituted.  In our own analysis of a 
wrong side surgery, we found a bitemporal risk profile – initial mis-bookings that were propagated 
forward, and failure to adhere to marking and site visualization immediately before the incision.  Focused 
revisions to protocols and the electronic booking system have reduced these risks. 
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FMEA is a powerful tool in the hands of a surgeon tasked with improving patient care.  A knowledge of 
its scope and limitations will allow effective integration with other members of the performance 
improvement team. 
 
AVOIDING DRIFT: LEADERSHIP BEHAVIORS THAT SUSTAIN PERFORMANCE 
Previous chapters in this monograph have provided a framework to diagnose and intervene on those 
systematic problems that threaten the safety and quality of health care. In this chapter, we will address some 
of the leadership tools needed to both achieve these goals and sustain performance over time.   
In doing so, we acknowledge that every institution has its own intrinsic culture (“if you have seen one 
academic medical center, you have seen one academic medical center”). Still, we would argue that all our 
institutions are more alike than they are different. Moreover, similar leadership principles apply even if the 
tactics may need modification depending on the situation. 
In specific we will consider what leaders can do to successfully address the following key objectives:  
1) building a culture which values safety and efficiency 
2) properly incentivizing personnel 
3) developing a forward-thinking organization which is proactive rather than reactive 
 
Building a culture which values safety and efficiency 
In his book “Organizational Culture and Leadership”, Edgar Schein discusses the challenge associated with 
defining the term “culture”.136 Culture, in and of itself is an abstract concept; however, it drives nearly all 
of the forces present in social and organizational situations. Culture is not only shaped by leadership 
behavior, but it can also influence and constrict how we behave within our hospitals. Culture is created 
when individual beliefs lead to shared experiences that solve a current problem. However, it is the leader 
who initiates this process by demonstrating his or her beliefs, values and assumptions in both words and 
deeds.  
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Aligning an organization not only necessitates a definitive vision and set of goals, but also requires 
sustained enthusiasm for the change process. Oftentimes, employees are motivated to change their 
behaviors only when the issues are so bad that they pose an existential threat. This too often produces only 
temporary motivation that dies down as soon as the issues are less pressing.137  
There is a critical balance between the magnitude of the goals and the time projected for completion. Goals 
must be grand enough to inspire. The great architect and city planner of Chicago, Daniel Burnham (1846-
1912) famously said, “Make no little plans, they have no magic to stir men’s blood.” If goals are exclusively 
short-term and modest, employees often lose focus and ambition. Engaged personnel may become 
discouraged, thinking that their leaders do not have faith in their ability to make real change. Conversely, 
if goals are truly unrealistic or too long term, people wonder if they have a long enough tenure to enjoy the 
outcome. In fact, most individuals won’t commit to long-term transformation unless they see expected 
results within 12-24 months. 138 By dividing large tasks into a series of important interim goals that are 
attainable, but not easily so, a greater motivation and sense of urgency is created. Moreover, this method 
allows for the systematic development of short-term wins to both meet and celebrate which has been found 
to increase this sense of urgency. 138 
There are many styles of leadership and most of them can be successful depending on the situation. 
However, it is imperative that the style is matched to the personality of the leader and the demands of the 
situation. One thing is clear: To be consistent and credible, your behavior must be based on an individual’s 
“true self.” If you are introverted, it is not necessary or recommended that you morph into the most outgoing 
person at every social occasion. Fundamentally, one must spend some effort to identify and augment the 
ways in which they feel comfortable interfacing positively with others. Simply put, individuals will not be 
as successful if they can’t find a personal style that allows regular and appropriate acknowledgment of the 
value of their peers. It is possible that an appreciative note or email is more aligned with one’s personality 
than a spontaneous hallway chat. An invitation to meet for coffee may work better for certain individuals 
than a scheduled office appointment. As long as someone’s methods are recognized as being genuine and 
consistent with past behavior, colleagues will be attuned to affirming actions. 
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While charismatic leadership is easily identified and often praised, in truth, the most durable and successful 
leadership styles empower others rather than concentrating the creative energy in one individual. The best 
strategies revolve around making colleagues feel better about themselves and their contributions. For 
example, transformational leadership, characterized by motivation, consideration of individual 
needs/abilities, and idealized influence has been found to positively influence team behavior in the 
operating room.139 If a leader can create that sense of personal pride within her followers, a true sense of 
ownership is engendered, and expectations are lifted.   
Another key attribute of successful leaders is consistency. This extends to both personal conduct and core 
values.  People perform better if they can reliably predict their leader’s highest priorities and have a clear 
understanding of how they should conduct themselves. Creating such stable and shared expectations is the 
process by which we hardwire behaviors of excellence into employees and ingrain a culture of personal 
responsibility into the organization.  
Studies of diverse work environments have demonstrated that employees who understand the connection 
between their individual efforts and the overall goals of the organization are more engaged, focused, and 
productive.140,141,142 At every level, effective communication is the key to maintaining this type of focus.  
For example, if a nurse does not understand that increased duration of urinary catheterization is strongly 
associated with risk of urinary tract infections (UTI), does not know the hospital’s data regarding UTI rates 
and related patient outcomes, and is unaware of the Medicare policy that penalizes hospitals for catheter-
associated UTI, he/she may find a hospital’s directive to remind physicians to remove urinary catheters to 
be arbitrary or pointless; predictably, compliance with such a directive will be poor.  
While there is a tendency to direct the most attention to carefully fashioned communications that are 
disseminated across the institution, small, personal interactions which reinforce a shared purpose are often 
more effective in boosting employee morale. To our disadvantage, the healthcare industry is saddled with 
a culture in which negative feedback dominates. When was the last time you heard of a surgeon calling the 
radiology department schedulers to thank them for fitting in that urgent CT scan? But consider how such a 
brief “pat on the back” might impact the individual who received it, and for no cost at all.  
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When these types of positive and unexpected courtesies become more frequent, surprising benefits can 
accrue. It begins at the top with supervisors who are inclined to complement rather than criticize.  While it 
is not desirable to over celebrate modest achievements, as credibility can be lost and expectations “dumbed 
down,” the best leaders can find at least one thing each day that is, in fact, accomplished above and beyond 
expectations and be sure their team hears about it.   
Successful organizations have learned to provide frequent reminders of excellent outcomes while weaving 
individual efforts into the positive result.142 As just one example, reuniting a grateful patient, successfully 
treated for a life-threatening disease, with the nursing and medical staff who provided the hospital care is 
always a compelling narrative. The pride created in the responsible unit is invariably shared across the 
entire staff and provides real motivation to live up to the highest institutional standards. 
In healthcare, more than nearly any other industry, we are fortunate that the majority of workers are “other 
directed” and have already demonstrated great dedication and persistence to reach their positions. Put most 
simply, the single most important job for a leader is to activate this intrinsic motivation within her 
followers.143,144 To this point, Brown and Gunderman explain that physician satisfaction and performance 
are closely tied to maximizing the time physicians perform the professional activities that they enjoy 
doing.145  Shanafelt and coworkers studied a large number of internal medicine trainees at the Mayo Clinic 
and confirmed that high satisfaction, better patient care and low burn-out rates were best correlated with 
more time being spent on the services they most value personally.146   There is every reason to be believe 
this is true for all health care workers. 
It logically follows that the key to successful organizations is creating those structures and processes which 
administratively support this goal; that is, allowing professionals to do what they have been trained to do. 
Leaders need to visualize themselves as agents to break down the barriers that too often stand between 
highly motivated caregivers and their patients. Every administrative modification needs to be evaluated in 
the context of its impact on workflow or it will be resisted irrespective of benefit.  
Most experienced leaders have learned this lesson, sometimes painfully. Not long ago, we implemented a 
novel and accurate method to precisely quantitate blood loss on sponges during surgery. A strong case was 
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made for the utility of this information and strong physician champions stepped forward. Implementation 
required a change in the established workflow for handling discarded sponges, which leadership did not 
consider to be a substantial modification. In reality, however, this change was a real impediment to 
acceptance. Despite strong technical support, the process was viewed negatively from the start; nurses 
complained stridently that the process change distracted them from more critical tasks. In short order, 
implementation failed until the equipment was modified to make it considerably more user friendly. Life 
moved forward but retrospective assessment made it clear that if we had looked at the application through 
the lens of our nursing colleagues first (i.e. asking the simple question - were we making it easier or harder 
for them to do their most important tasks?), much aggravation could have been avoided.  
Leaders can gain valuable insights by focusing not only on what isn’t working well in an organization but 
also by identifying what is working well. Understandably, we often find ourselves responding to 
shortcomings rather than identifying high-performing people, units, or departments and investigating what 
it is that makes them successful. The most obvious solution involves redesigning the workflows in less 
successful units so that they function more similarly to those in the higher performing units.  Such internal 
benchmarking avoids the push back often seen when “outside” solutions, sourced from other institutions or 
consultants, are introduced. At the least, using methods already in place somewhere within the hospital 
defeats the argument that the local problems are so unique that no outside remedy will suffice. 
Tracking the efficacy of process improvements in health care surely requires accurate data, but more than 
anything it requires a willingness to objectively evaluate the day-to-day functions in person. Many leaders 
have adopted routine tours of hospital units, physician’s clinics, research laboratories, and even the 
cafeteria, a concept now commonly known as “managing by walking around.”147 Keeping your eyes and 
ears engaged can yield remarkable insights about what is going on at the ground level. Rounding in this 
manner also allows leaders the opportunity to visibly recognize and reward movement towards the 
organization’s goals. Yogi Berra, a philosopher of the highest order, had it right: “You can see a lot by 
watching.” 
Properly incentivizing personnel 
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It is generally accepted that “you get what you incent.” Like most aphorisms, there is much truth in the 
statement. That being said, it is not always possible to predict what the precise impact of a given incentive 
is on personal and group behaviors or what secondary consequences may ensue. This is particularly true in 
professional occupations like medicine in which there is considerable latitude for personal discretion. 
Despite the obvious attractiveness of higher incomes, there are important limitations of using financial 
incentives to drive behavior. For one, the major satisfier of high performing professionals is not 
compensation per se. While it may seem counterintuitive at first consideration, this turns out to be true 
irrespective of the industry. 
In his book “What Got You Here Won’t Get You There,” Marshall Goldsmith interviewed 200 “stars” from 
a wide variety of for-profit and non-profit organizations.148 He was interested in understanding what factors 
predisposed the retention of such high performers, considering that their success undoubtedly made them 
attractive to lucrative offers elsewhere. In these anonymous and detailed interviews with valued employees, 
he asked, “Why will you be here in five years?” He noted that the top three responses rarely included salary 
or bonuses. Rather, respondents frequently cited work satisfaction and interpersonal factors – “I like the 
people I work with. I enjoy the work. The organization is giving me the chance to do what I want to do.” 
While straightforward on the surface, these simple answers reflect a highly nuanced blending of personal 
satisfaction and team goals. They suggest that for high performers, pride in individual achievement and 
participation in positive group behaviors are the key motivators of outstanding work. The risk of 
discounting these drivers is not trivial. 
Over the last decade, most academic medical centers have strongly focused their compensation decisions 
and incentives for clinical faculty on measures of clinical productivity. Commonly used metrics include the 
numbers of procedures or clinic visits and work relative value units (wRVU). To correct for payor mix and 
ensure financial balance, others look exclusively at cash collected. To mute excessive competition between 
faculty, who are, after all, essentially partners in medical practice, many organizations including ours have 
modified productivity measures to include sectional or organizational targets in addition to individual 
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targets. The weight assigned to group goals generally increases as physicians become more senior with 
greater management responsibilities.   
These types of incentives and performance expectations are both useful and necessary. It is unquestioned 
that the financial benefit is always appreciated and is influential in sustaining motivation and retaining high 
performing practitioners. That said, there is considerable evidence that, irrespective of the industry, cash 
incentives alone are limited in their ability to reshape culture and organizational behavior. The critical 
misstep is overreliance on their power coupled with an illusion that fine-tuning incentives will be uniformly 
effective in modifying the behaviors of professionals.  
For the last 10 years, we have included certain quality metrics and cultural expectations in our incentive 
plans. We are not convinced it has substantially impacted behaviors. This may reflect the fact that these 
measures are necessarily somewhat subjective and personal attribution of process improvement or 
deterioration may be difficult. As well, the total cash allocated for meeting citizenship and safety goals 
ranges from 15% to 25% of the potential bonus pool and is substantially less than the rewards for high 
research or clinical productivity.  
As other professions now know, we are learning that cash bonuses must be combined with non-financial 
“intrinsic rewards” in order to be effective.149 Organizations have approached this balance in a variety of 
ways: 1) adjusting the work schedules of high performing physicians such that a more ideal distribution 
of research, clinical, and personal time can be achieved, or 2) providing additional resources (assistants, 
research support, etc.) that make their day-to-day lives more productive and enjoyable.150,151  
Two additional lessons appear clear. After the initiation of any incentive program, it is important to 
objectively assess the true “downstream” effects and adjust appropriately. While too frequent modifications 
to an incentive plan can be unsettling to all, maintaining an ineffective program more seriously undermines 
managerial credibility. Second, and most importantly, a great incentive program cannot act as a substitute 
for hiring and promoting the right people whose values parallel that of the organization as a whole. This 
nurturing of human capital is unquestionably a key leadership responsibility.   
Developing a forward-thinking organization which is proactive rather than reactive 
55 
 
We close with perhaps the greatest challenge. How can we insure that the complex organizations we work 
within maintain a vigilance for potential safety hazards and proactively pursue “fixes” even before problems 
occur? Such an attitude runs counter to one of the great maxims and one very applicable to surgical practice: 
“if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”  
Proactive safety activities are best supported in organizations that exhibit a strong safety culture. 
Organizations with a positive safety culture are characterized by shared beliefs of the importance of safety, 
mutual trust, and confidence in the effectiveness of preventative measures. An organization with a positive 
safety culture is better prepared to identify and diagnosis safety hazards proactively, before an incident or 
accident occurs.152 
To anticipate problems, we need early warning systems. The slightly misnamed “near miss” describes that 
disaster that nearly happened except for good fortune. In our institution we have worked to strongly 
encourage and reward our citizens for recognizing and reporting these events. Incident reporting, when 
conducted appropriately, can provide an organization with valuable information about potential systemic 
vulnerabilities that can be corrected before a major unsafe act occurs.153 This practice requires an 
exceptional level of professionalism as these incidents rarely involve just one person and no one likes to be 
thought of as an informer on their fellow practitioners especially when “nothing bad happened.” We counter 
this tendency by emphasizing the systemic nature of most medical errors or potential errors. This evolution 
has been further advanced by incorporating sophisticated human factor analysis into our reviews of the 
most serious reports.154 
Another important source of information on potential risks is currently underutilized. We believe that more 
transparency between institutions would allow each of us to learn from others’ experiences, before that 
same error surfaces on our floors or operating rooms. An excellent example of such information sharing in 
another high-risk industry is the Natural Transportation Safety Board’s practice to regularly release 
substantial details of any serious safety event or crash in private or commercial aviation Shipping or 
commercial carriage.155 While there are undoubtedly substantial reputational and medical-legal 
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impediments to public disclosures of adverse medical events, sharing of de-identified accounts within a 
peer review protected consortium would be an attractive solution. 
Finally, there has been much discussion of the value of a “blame free” culture which would further 
encourage reporting and full exposition of any safety related event. Indeed, the majority of medical errors 
and safety violations are both unintentional and not ascribed to the behavior of one individual divorced 
from the hospital ecosystem. Still, it is not uncommon for a single practitioner’s actions to be a primary 
trigger for system failure.  
In his pathbreaking 1979 book Forgive and Remember, Charles Bosk classified medical error as either 
technical and judgmental (“non-normative”) or moral and behavioral (“normative”).156 In a healthy medical 
culture, these non-normative errors need to be discussed and addressed, but are forgivable if the incidence 
is low, paralleling the expected complication rate of a treatment or procedure. In contrast, normative errors 
reflect the character of the physicians much more than their competence. Violation of these norms is 
evidence of fundamental dishonesty or culpable lack of discipline. Such behavior merits censure or even 
exclusion. While we understand the advantages of avoiding the reflexive assignment of blame, we have 
viewed knowingly violating hospital policy, especially as regards safety issues, as a classic normative error 
and hence unacceptable. 
Conclusion 
Given the extraordinary complexity of medical care, maintaining high levels of performance in quality and 
safety is perhaps the single greatest leadership challenge in modern hospitals. This is especially true for 
large tertiary centers with critically ill patients and a strong reliance on technology. Sustaining excellence 
in these critical areas requires extraordinary attention to the entire work environment along with the 
strongest interpersonal skills among leaders at every level. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. History of Systematic Quality Improvement  
 
 
Figure 2. SPC Chart of Mortality. Only common-cause (random) variation is observed. It would be 
incorrect to attribute any single data point to “good” or “bad” performance 
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Figure 3. Annual publication volume for health care quality improvement methodologies, 1991-
2012. Adapted from Health Care Quality Improvement Publication Trends26 
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Figure 4. Overview of Systems Engineering. Adapted from Better Health Care and Lower Costs: 
Accelerating Improvement Through Systems Engineering26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 The SEIPS model of Human Factors.  from Carayon 53 
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Figure 6. The basic Fishbone (Ishikawa) diagram 
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Figure 7.  Fishbone diagram developed at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in response to long LOS for 
uncomplicated appendectomy. 
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Figure 8 The basic 5 Why' 
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Figure 9  Portion of 5 Why’s Analysis for long appendectomy LOS at Cedars-Sinai Medical center 
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Figure 10  Various relationships of Failure Modes and downstream effects 
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Figure 11  Portion of Process Mapping and Failure Modes in examining wrong side surgery at 
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12  Determining the Risk Priority Number 
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Figure 13  The RPI table for wrong side surgery.  
Row 
Number
Process Steps or 
Product Functions
Potential Failure Mode-
SELECT THE 5 
FAILURE MODES 
THAT HAPPEN MOST 
FREQUENTLY
Occurrence 
(1-10)
Potential Effects of Failure - 
SELECT THE 5 
OUTCOMES THAT WOULD 
HAVE THE MOST SEVERE 
IMPACT ON THE PATIENT
Severity 
(1-10)
Current Controls-
SELECT THE 5 
CONTROLS THAT 
WOULD BE LEAST 
LIKELY TO DETECT 
THE FAILURE
Detection 
(1-10)
Risk Priority 
Number (RPN)
1
Surgeon makes 
decision for surgery
2
Surgeon completes 
order set
Order set completed 
incorrectly
7 Delays in scheduling case 2 Surgery scheduler is 
unable to schedule 
surgery
3 42
Surgeon completes 
order set
Standard order set is not 
used
10 Surgeon incorrectly 
documents laterality of 
procedure
3 PPTP requires orders 
prior to surgery
3 90
3
Surgeon documents 
laterality of procedure
Side/site information 
missing
7 Delays in scheduling case 4 Surgery scheduler 
reviews and verifies 
order set, utilizing 
radiology reports for 
clarity and requires MD 
clarification when 
needed
5 140
Surgeon documents 
laterality of procedure
Incorrect side/site 
documented
5 Surgery Scheduler lists 
incorrect info in OR sched
5 PPTP verifies 
information with patient 
prior to surgery
5 125
Surgery scheduler 
reviews order set and 
calls patient to 
schedule procedure
Patient side/site differs 
from MD order
5 Delays in scheduling case 3 Surgery scheduler 
reviews and verifies 
order set, utilizing 
radiology reports for 
clarity and requires MD 
clarification when 
needed
4 60
Surgery scheduler 
reviews order set and 
calls patient to 
schedule procedure 
and verified side/site
Patient incorrectly 
confirms side/site
6 Surgery Scheduler lists 
incorrect info in OR sched
4 PPTP verifies 
information with patient 
prior to surgery
5 120
Surgery scheduler 
reviews order set and 
calls patient to 
schedule procedure 
and verified side/site
Patient does not confirm 
side/site
4 Delays in scheduling case 4 Surgery scheduler 
reviews and verifies 
order set, utilizing 
radiology reports for 
clarity and requires MD 
clarification when 
needed
5 80
Surgery scheduler 
reviews order set and 
calls patient to 
schedule procedure 
and verified side/site
Patient does not confirm 
side/site
2 Delays in scheduling case 2 Surgery scheduler 
reviews and verifies 
order set, utilizing 
radiology reports for 
clarity and requires MD 
clarification when 
needed
5 20
4
Surgery Scheduler 
utilizes radiology report 
and/or initial complaint 
for clarification
Radiology report 
incorrect
2 Surgery Scheduler lists 
incorrect info in OR sched
2 PPTP verifies 
information with patient 
prior to surgery
5 20
Process
Sort Sort
81 
 
TABLE 1. DMAIC 
D: Define the problem, the customer’s requirements, and the project’s goals. 
M: Measure and collect data on the current process to understand the problem 
A: Analyze data and decide which problems to tackle first based on a Pareto analysis which identifies the 
elements most responsible for the problem. 
I: Improve the process verifying that the improvements work. 
C: Control the processes to ensure that errors don’t creep in again. 
 
TABLE 2. Lean’s classic seven “Deadly Wastes.”  
1. Overproduction (producing items ahead of demand)  
2. Inventory (excess material and information)  
3. Defects (production of items not conforming to customer’s specification)  
4. Transport (unnecessary transport of materials or equipment)  
5. Motion (unnecessary human movements or strain)  
6. Over-processing (process steps that are not required)  
7. Waiting (idle time and delays)  
 
